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The global financial crisis has revealed serious weaknesses in Serbia’s 
economic and social systems. Short–term measures to mitigate the negative 
effects of the crisis were only partially successful. In 2010, the welfare state 
has been marked as one of the priority areas of middle–term state reforms, but 
so far, there have been no radical cuts, even though it is uncertain, whether 
this situation is sustainable. The main directions of reform, have been, and 
will be, directed by deficit budgetary funds (i.e. the need to reduce the share 
of social transfers within the GDP and their sustainability). Even though ac-
cessibility and quality have been declared as equally important reform objec-
tives, effects of reforms point to fiscal constraints as the most important chal-
lenge. Austerity measures, characteristic of the Serbian welfare state, during 
the crisis are not only linked to the crisis, but may be viewed as a part of 
the declining role of the state after the breakdown of socialism in the 1990s. 
Therefore, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between the measures as a re-
action to the crisis and those contemplated prior to the crisis, because their 
aims seem rather compatible. 
Key words: the crisis, welfare, labour market, social welfare, pensions, 
health.
INTRODUCTION
The processes of globalization and in-
tegration of world economies favoured the 
export of the financial and economic cri-
sis from the United States of America to 
the rest of the world. The crisis itself has 
become global, but its manifestations, out-
comes, depth and duration have differed 
significantly across countries. Once again, 
the “club of the developed” proved to be 
more resilient to its effects and invested 
into different packages of stimulating eco-
nomic measures, in contrast with develop-
ing countries. Their already fragile econo-
mies have been confronted with these new 
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financial and economic shocks and this has 
resulted in severely weakened coping capa-
bilities. The effects of the crisis have gener-
ally ranged from almost universal drop in 
GDPs, to decreased investments and de-
mand, sharp drops in employment and in-
creased unemployment and poverty levels.
In such a situation, the provision of ba-
sic social welfare benefits and opportuni-
ties for active participation in society for 
all, becomes even more important. The role 
of welfare programmes in the reduction and 
limitation of economic and social impacts 
of the crisis cannot be overstated. However, 
in Serbian society, those automatic stabiliz-
ers (Stiglitz, 2009) have been gradually 
eroding ever since the breakdown of so-
cialism and resulted in the increasing im-
portance of market principles in the welfare 
system. The current crisis has pointed to 
severe disadvantages in market–driven ap-
proaches, thus presenting sound ground for 
a new delineation between market and state 
competencies in the welfare sector. How-
ever, it has reduced the financial and ad-
ministrative capacities for efficient change 
(Arandarenko et al., 2009). Exit strategies 
are difficult to design, because of the need 
to position them at the narrow intersection 
between costs and benefits and due to the 
ever changing circumstances during the 
crisis period. 
The main hypothesis of this paper is 
that the roots of the process of dismantling 
the welfare state in the national perspective 
can be traced back to the beginning of the 
transition in the 1990s. Therefore, the guid-
ing research question is whether it could be 
described as a continuous and autonomous 
process, initiated a long time before the 
current crisis, although somewhat accel-
erated by the impact of the crisis. The ef-
fects of the crisis on the national economy, 
described in the first section are followed 
by the presentation of the Government’s 
anti-crisis measures in the second section. 
The central part of the paper is the review 
of changes in the welfare state programmes 
in the fourth section. Traditional areas of 
welfare state programmes: labour market 
and social welfare programmes, pensions 
and health protection are the focus of the 
paper. The time period during which the 
mentioned areas are analyzed is usually the 
period from the end of 2008 to 2011/2012. 
However, frequently the period well before 
the crisis is taken into consideration, due to 
its relevance for the analysis and explana-
tion of the measures taken during the crisis. 
In the concluding remarks, the authors ar-
gue that the austerity measures during the 
crisis are a part of a wider context of the na-
tional welfare state paradigmatic shift that 
started more than two decades ago. 
EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS 
ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
POVERTY
Despite the initial optimism that the 
global economic and financial crisis would 
bypass Serbia, at the end of 2008 it be-
come obvious that this would not happen. 
The disadvantaged position of Serbia was 
mainly caused by the dramatic develop-
ments during the 1990s. After the period 
of the “blocked transformation” during the 
1990s, the real political, economic and so-
cial transition began in 2000, followed by 
the economic recovery, stabilization and 
growth. In the upcoming years, reforms 
were implemented with varying intensity, 
consistency and under the strong influence 
of international financial institutions. Dur-
ing the period between 2000 and 2008, 
significant economic growth was achieved, 
along with macroeconomic stability and 
the liberalization of prices and foreign 
trade in the labour market and welfare 
sector. Real GDP growth was moving at a 
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rate of 5.6% per year. The standard of liv-
ing was significantly improved and a huge 
breakthrough was made in reducing the 
percentage of the population living below 
the poverty line. Between 2001 and 2007, 
real wage growth was around 10% per year. 
The percentage of people living in absolute 
poverty decreased after 2000, especially in 
the period between 2006 and 2008, from 
8.8% to 6.1% (Vlada RS, 2011a).
However, a wide range of problems 
remained unsolved. This additionally con-
tributed to the vulnerability of social and 
economic systems to economic and finan-
cial shocks. One of the most serious and 
most persistent problems was related to 
the characteristics of the Serbian labour 
market. The relevant indicators of the la-
bour market functioning were unfavorable, 
especially compared to the EU or even 
to other Western Balkan countries.1 The 
Serbian labour market has been showing 
characteristics of the transition processes: 
a persistently high unemployment rate, an 
especially high share of long term unem-
ployment, a low employment rate with an 
unfavourable employment structure and 
extremely high share of employment in 
the public sector, a generally high level of 
employment in agriculture, a high rate of 
informal employment and a high share of 
insecure jobs (Arandarenko et al., 2009). 
Negative trends from the 1990s, simply 
continued throughout the first decade of the 
2000s, and with the processes of privatiza-
tion and economic restructuring, the situ-
ation was becoming even more complex. 
The number of employees was declining 
for much of the first decade of the 2000s, 
and the fall was especially dramatic since 
the beginning of the crisis in 2008. Just 
from October 2008 to October 2009, the 
number of employees fell by almost 200 
000 or 7%.  In 2010, the number of em-
ployed reached its minimum of 2 279 000, 
a decrease of almost 11% from 2005. The 
employment rate fell from 54% to 50.3%, 
and it continues to be especially low for 
women (42.2%) and young people aged 
15 to 24 (15%) (Arandarenko et al., 2013). 
Even though the position of women in the 
labour market continues to be unfavour-
able, during the first years of the crisis the 
decline of employment was sharper among 
men, because of their greater participation 
in the sectors of the economy that were 
affected by the crisis.  This will probably 
change in the upcoming years with the de-
crease in the number of employees in the 
public sector. During the same period, the 
number of unemployed people increased 
by almost 60 000, which increased the un-
employment rate from 14.7% to 17.4%. A 
significantly lower growth in the unem-
ployment rate compared to a decline in 
employment indicates that large numbers 
of people become inactive. Nevertheless, 
the unemployment rate continued to grow 
to 23.7% in 2011, then 25.5% in 2012 and 
24.1% in 2013 (RSZ, 2011, 2012, 2013).
Because of an economic downturn, 
there was a deterioration in the standard 
of living and the number of people living 
in absolute poverty, after a steady decrease 
over time, started to increase again. In 
2009, the absolute poverty rate was 6.9% 
and in 2010 it was 9.2% (Vlada RS, 2011a). 
The increase is particularly evident among 
people with a lower education and children 
below 15. The position of specific vulner-
able groups was particularly exacerbated 
during the crisis because of the: reduc-
tion of the labour supply in the informal 
economy, loss of employment in the formal 
1  From 2009 to 2012, the percentages of unemployment rates based on LFSs were comparatively the worst 
for Serbia, except for FYROM and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The countries being compared also included Bulgaria, 
Romania, Montenegro, Hungary and Croatia.
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economy, small chances of finding a new 
job and reduction of earnings in the formal 
and informal economies. 
GOVERNMENT’S ANTI–CRISIS 
MEASURES
A reduction in economic activities led 
to the reduction in budget revenues and re-
quired the adoption of anti–crisis measures. 
Accordingly, at the end of 2008, and espe-
cially during 2009, the Serbian government 
formulated and adopted a set of economic 
measures in order to mitigate the negative 
effect of the crises. In December 2008 the 
document Economic crises and its influ-
ence on the Serbian economy containing a 
general program of measures for mitigat-
ing the effects of the economic crisis was 
adopted. It represented a combination of 
restrictive measures and incentives, as a 
consequence of the need to reduce expendi-
tures while stimulating exports and foreign 
investments, savings, etc.
During the first three months of 2009, 
several packages of economic measures 
were formulated. In March 2009 the ne-
gotiations with IMF were opened to revise 
the credit arrangement, focusing on budget 
deficits. Meanwhile, in early April 2009, 
the Government’s plan for the economic 
stability of Serbia was adopted. That plan 
promoted: cheaper public administration, 
social responsibility of the state, the protec-
tion of the standard of living, stimulation of 
economic activity, as well as investments in 
the infrastructure. The biggest area of sav-
ings was supposed to be in continuing the 
reform of public administration in order to 
reduce expenditures of state authorities, as 
well in prohibiting new employment in the 
public sector. Active labour market mea-
sures included: support for hiring appren-
tices, public works programmes especially 
in underdeveloped areas, incentives for 
employers to create jobs etc. (as described 
in more detail in the following section).
Negative consequences of the crisis 
were manifested, such as: obstacles that 
prevented employees to exercise their 
rights, particularly in privatized firms, 
and private employers who did not fulfill 
their responsibilities as prescribed in social 
programmes by not paying their share of 
contributions to social insurance. In order 
to overcome negative consequences of the 
crisis, a Budgetary Fund was established, 
and The Social Protection Plan was adopt-
ed in August 2009. This plan has provided 
for the payment of contributions to old–age 
and disability insurance for the employees 
whose employers did not settle this ob-
ligation in the period from 2005 to 2009, 
along with the payment of contributions 
for health insurance for 2009. The Plan 
also envisaged one–off financial assistance 
for the employees with the lowest income, 
as well as the rescheduling of unpaid bills 
for electric utilities. Despite the adopted 
programmes and envisaged measures, fis-
cal policy during all of 2009, reflected the 
strong impact of the crisis, while the re-
vised budget was directed toward increas-
ing public expenditure.
In 2010 there was a slight economic 
recovery, but activities targeting fiscal ad-
justment were continued. Additional regu-
lations were adopted in order to define the 
exact number of people working in the 
public sector, so it could be reduced. The 
data for late 2010 and early 2011 indicate 
increased total indebtedness, reduction in 
revenues from privatization and interna-
tional competitiveness of the Serbian econ-
omy (Vuković and Perišić, 2012c).
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WELFARE STATE PROGRAMMES 
New/Old Paradigms on the Labour 
Market
A strand of measures to protect the un-
employed during the crisis has included 
certain redefinitions of both passive and ac-
tive labour market programmes (ALMPs). 
Passive labour market programmes are the 
old paradigm, rooted in the Bismarckian 
origins of the welfare state in Serbia. They 
are clearly dominant over the new para-
digm of activation. The real impact of the 
latter can be highly contested. Currently, 
cash benefits for the unemployed have been 
regulated by a law passed in 2009,2 which 
was actually conceived prior to the crisis. 
There is a strong argument that the current 
legislative framework presents a mere con-
tinuation of overall phasing-out of inter-
ventions by the state. During the 1990s the 
unemployed were entitled to rather gener-
ous benefits, which were completely depre-
ciated by hyperinflation and the safety of 
their employment was actually compromis-
ing economic aspects of labour. Unlike the 
1990s, institutional aspects of labour mar-
ket reforms and unemployment insurance 
have been strongly dominated by flexible 
norms and reduced entitlements of employ-
ees in general since the year 2000.3 
As a result of the gradual tightening of 
eligibility criteria, unemployment benefits 
are now payable for a period from 3 to 12 
months,4 depending on the employment 
history. They amount to 50% of the average 
salary of the beneficiary during six months 
that preceded the employment termination. 
The protective clause is that the amount 
of the benefit cannot be below 80% of the 
minimum wage, but it also cannot be above 
160% of it. Despite the crisis, the decision 
makers yet opted for a slight reduction in 
the amount of benefits as of 2009, based 
on the argument that it “would not have a 
significant impact on the incidence of pov-
erty” (Corbanese, 2011:56). The reason is 
twofold: the beneficiaries have tended to be 
above the poverty line and they do not rep-
resent a huge group. Much less than 10% of 
registered unemployed people are entitled 
to them. Moreover, available data suggests 
that the average amount of unemployment 
benefits, as a consequence of changes, “has 
become similar to an average level in com-
parable countries of the Western Balkans 
as well as in Central and Eastern Europe” 
(Arandarenko, 2011b:188).
Both the decreasing number of cash 
beneficiaries from 2009 to 2011 (Table 
1) and lower amounts of an average cash 
benefit are a reflection of tighter eligibility 
criteria, in terms of reduced duration of the 
entitlement period and replacement ratio. 
This situation is inversely proportional to 
the increased number of registered unem-
ployed people and increased expenditures 
for unemployment benefits. “Total ex-
penditures for unemployment benefits in-
creased from RSD 18.5 billion in 2008 to 
RSD 25.5 billion in 2010. However, behind 
this remarkable growth during the crisis, 
there are substantial dynamics, reflecting 
the fact that in 2009 and 2010 all arrears, 
2  The subjected law is The Law on Employment and Insurance against Unemployment.
3  However, one of the side-effects of the previous legislation on unemployment benefits is the existence of a 
high proportion of expenditures for passive versus ALMP. “Although, in the past decade there was a strong need and 
motivation to minimize the share of passive labour market measures, as opposed to active, there are many problems 
in practice. Expenditures for unemployment benefits have been constantly pushing out active measures, accounting 
for even 87 to 96% of the overall budget for active and passive labour market measures” (Vuković and Perišić, 
2012a:73), as shown in the Table 1.
4  The benefit is payable for 24 months, provided that a person misses two years to be entitled to a pension (The 
Law on Employment and Insurance against Unemployment, OG 36/09., 88/10., art. 72).
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which amounted to the 5 month lags in 
payments during 2008, were removed” 
(Arandarenko, 2011b:38). Still, expendi-
tures for unemployment benefits amounted 
to as low as app. 0.5% GDP on average in 
the period between 2007 and 2010 (Vlada 
RS, 2011a:115). 
5  The authors would like to express their gratitude to Mr. Nikola Atanackovic from the National Employment 
Service for his great contribution in compiling data.
6  Currently valid ALMPs are a part of The Law on Employment and Insurance against Unemployment of 2009.
Table 1. 








fits, in RSD 000 




ures, in RSD 
000 000 per 
current prices










2000 47 393 758 521 59.3 40.7
2001 51 156 2 429 1 057 70.2 29.8
2002 69 566 4 716 1 306 78.3 21.7
2003 90 995 7 891 881 90.0 10.0
2004 76 584 11 404 410 96.5 3.5
2005 63 295 12 639 1 545 89.1 10.9
2006 75 059 15 054 1 540 90.7 9.3
2007 71 334 17 920 2 165 89.2 10.8
2008 72 719 20 007 3 365 85.6 14.4
2009 86 602 22 863 3 275 87.4 12.6
2010 79 417 25 521 3 685 87.3 12.7
2011 68 187 17 547 3 436 83.6 16.4
2012 70 355 16 432 3 266 83.4 16.6
Source: Arandarenko, 2011a; NSZ, 2011, 2012, 2013; own calculations.5 
Another path, that of ALMP, has been 
arguably restructured, so as to be more 
clearly linked to the crisis. First of all, 
ALMPs were introduced in 2003 in order 
to contribute to the overall promotion of 
the value of human capital. “Active em-
ployment policy was conceived in a nice 
and modern manner in the law. Problems 
arise in its specification: neither is there 
money for them, nor does the National Em-
ployment Service (NES) operate at a suf-
ficiently high level” (Mijatović, 2005:314). 
Therefore, legislative changes to the ALMP 
have been prepared since 2007,6 so as to be 
redefined, with a view to overcoming rigid 
rules and becoming more inclusive. 
At the beginning of the crisis, in April 
2009, two active labour market pro-
grammes were also intensified based on 
expectations of severe consequences due 
to their positions at the time of the crisis: 
those focused on youth without work expe-
rience and those focused on the long-term 
unemployed. These included an apprentice 
programme called The First Chance, and 
public works. The First Chance was result-
ed in high coverage, reduced unemploy-
ment in youth, and satisfaction between 
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both trainees and employers. However, the 
main objections to it were that it was not di-
rected at the young people who are the most 
vulnerable (i.e. those with primary school 
education),7 the costs have been very high 
and obligations of employers have been 
rather relaxed. On the other hand, funding 
for public works almost doubled in 2009 
and some preliminary data pointed to their 
progress in terms of an increased cover-
age of Roma and persons with disabilities. 
However, final evidence was disappointing 
regarding their effects on non-subsidized 
work of the participants. Therefore, im-
mediately in 2010, the financing of public 
works was reduced. These two programmes 
were largely implemented at the expense 
of other ALMPs (such as job subsidies) 
(Arandarenko, 2011b:34) during the cri-
sis, but drafting of individual employment 
plans experienced expansion as well as on-
the-job training for the workers affected by 
enterprise restructuring. On-the-job train-
ing, along with employment subsidies and 
self-employment programmes also targeted 
young people without work experience, 
minority groups, the disabled, etc. 
The overall funds devoted to ALMPs 
have remained extremely low, with 0.1% 
GDP on average in the period 2007 to 2010 
(Vlada RS, 2011a:115), without taking into 
account funds invested by local communi-
ties. There is evidence that the Province 
of Vojvodina alone spent almost the same 
amount of money for ALMPs as the entire 
Republic of Serbia (Corbanese, 2011:58). 
However, data from NES suggests that cur-
rent programmes cover even fewer partici-
pants than the passive programmes, i.e. 5% 
of all registered unemployed. It appears 
that the size of expenditures for active mea-
sures, which determined the percentage of 
users, decisively influenced the final effects 
of active labour market policies (Vuković 
and Perišić, 2012a). The funds and the 
scope of ALMPs raise doubts about the 
meaning of the discourse of activation in 
the national context. Limited funds, even in 
the case of their optimal influence, cannot 
essentially change total outcomes on the la-
bour market (Arandarenko, 2011b).
Activation Approaches to Social 
Welfare
Another strand of measures to protect 
the unemployed during the crisis and the 
disabled population in general has been the 
social welfare scheme. 
Legislative design of social welfare 
during the last two decades was regulated 
by the law8 in 1991. It was subjected to nu-
merous, important and essential changes, 
but a new law was not enacted until 2011. 
There are indications that the government 
accelerated its enactment due to a worsened 
social situation and increased poverty rates 
(Corbanese, 2011, Arandarenko, 2011b). 
The longitudinal data on the number of 
families receiving cash welfare benefits 
evidence their role of automatic stabilizers 
during the current crisis in Serbia (Table 2).
7  Data for 2010 indicates the dominance of young people with secondary (almost 63%) and university education 
(33.5%) in the programme. Additionally, 12.5% of users were more than 30 years old (NSZ, 2011).
8  The law mentioned is The Law on Social Welfare and Supporting Welfare of Citizens.
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Table 2.
The number of families receiving cash welfare benefits, 2002-2012
Year Number of families Growth index
2002 48 236 100.0
2003 54 272 112.5 
2004 61 371 127.2
2005 62 267 129.0
2006 65 869 136.5
2007 48 766 101.1
2008 50 608 104.9
2009 66 664 138.2
2010 72 997 151.3
2011 91 919 190.6
2012 118 555 245.8
Source: RZSZ, 2011, 2013; own calculations. 
The basic cash benefit programmes tar-
geting the poor on the state level are cash 
welfare benefits9 and child allowances. 
From 2007 to 2010, expenditures on these 
benefits amounted to as low as 0.15% GDP 
(Vlada RS, 2011a), which was compara-
tively extremely low, both from the point of 
view of the GDP percentage and real funds. 
In combination with very strict eligibility 
criteria, consequently only about 2% of the 
total number of households in Serbia was 
covered by social welfare, i.e. only 8.6% of 
the poor (Vlada RS, 2011a). Additionally, 
the amounts of benefits have been low, even 
below the poverty line. There was a strong 
case for the expansion of the programme, 
argued by the World Bank (Svetska banka, 
2009), but it was not expanded despite the 
fact that even significant increases in the 
funds devoted to social welfare benefits 
would not present a problem for the state 
budget.
Weaknesses in the Material Support 
to Households Programme were numer-
ous. It was passive and encouraged depen-
dence on social welfare (Petrović, 2011). 
The equivalence scale put large families 
into disadvantaged position (Matković and 
9  In The Law of 1991 this benefit was named Material Support to Households. 
Mijatović, 2009). The contribution to pov-
erty reduction was only modest, “compared 
to the EU average, and the efficiency of 
social transfers in Serbia has been almost 
seven times lower compared to the average 
value in the Union” (RZR, 2009:63). 
In an effort to overcome some of the 
basic obstacles, the new law of 2011 made 
changes in the eligibility criteria and equiv-
alence scale. It provided that 6 members in 
a household were entitled to cash welfare 
benefits, instead of the previously defined 
maximum of 5 members in a household, 
thereby enabling large families to ac-
cess the benefits in a more equitable way. 
The equivalence scale was adapted to the 
modified OECD scale, so that it made a 
difference between children and adults in a 
household in the following ways: 100% of 
the benefit was assigned to the first member 
of household, 50% to each additional adult 
and 30% to each child (The Law on Social 
Welfare, OG 24/2011, art. 88), and the defi-
nition of disabled was expanded. Addition-
ally, households without able-bodied mem-
bers became eligible to 20% increased cash 
benefits, and means testing that previously 
excluded those having ownership over 0.5 
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hectars of land was changed so as to ex-
clude those disabled who have over 1 ha 
(The Law on Social Welfare, OG 24/2011, 
art. 82). Finally, able-bodied beneficiaries 
continued to face limited duration of enti-
tlement. They continued to be entitled dur-
ing 9 months in a one year period.
One of the intended objectives of The 
Law of 2011 is to foster a proactive role on 
the part of beneficiaries through education, 
training and employment. However, there 
are concerns on one part of the public that 
the activation of beneficiaries is promoted 
instead of the activation of the state. The 
concern is that the victims are blamed for 
their situation, because of the inability of 
the state to create new jobs and offer them 
real possibilities for advancing their skills. 
In case of insisting on such a defensive ap-
proach to activation, it will not present a 
way out of the crisis, neither for the ben-
eficiaries nor for the state. An alternative 
approach to activation that would offer 
possibilities to develop and empower ben-
eficiaries is not a realistic option. Currently, 
an activation approach is not defined in any 
detail, and except for declining the right to 
social welfare benefit for able-bodied ben-
eficiaries during 3-month period, there are 
no activation measures by the state. A re-
search study conducted by Petrović (2011) 
focused on employment performance of 
social assistance beneficiaries. It points to 
a negligible employment rate among social 
assistance beneficiaries. Only 3% of them 
were employed, mainly in the grey econ-
omy, while only 41% were seeking jobs 
(Petrović, 2011:14). Even though the ba-
sis of the benefit amount10 has risen, it ac-
counts for about 17% of an average salary, 
which is 35% of a minimum wage. 
During the 1990s, entitlements to child 
allowances were rather universal. They 
targeted almost all children. In 2002 the 
government of Serbia designed them as a 
social policy measure to reduce poverty in 
children. Budgetary constraints at the be-
ginning of the 2000s required their selec-
tive design. There were no changes to this 
programme in connection with the crisis. 
Their amount is extremely low. It amounts 
to RSD 2 535 and RSD 3 295 in a regular 
amount and an increased amount, respec-
tively (MRZSP, 2013), presenting thus 
5.7% and 7.4% of the national average sal-
ary, respectively.11
The introduced changes are not likely to 
make a big difference in the reduction of 
poverty. Eligibility criteria are expected to 
increase the number of beneficiaries and to 
make for a more equitable distribution of 
the total amounts families receive. Whatev-
er the increase, the starting number of ben-
eficiaries is low. A micro–simulation con-
ducted by Arandarenko reports an expected 
decrease in the number of poor by 4% 
based on new regulations (Arandarenko, 
2011b) and concludes that “more generous 
initiatives are needed to effectively lift a 
greater number of poor above the absolute 
poverty line” (Arandarenko, 2011b:38). 
Complementary to this, Matković reports 
an expected increase in the number of re-
cipients by 50 to 60%, and an increase in 
expenditures for social assistance schemes 
by 70 to 80% (Petrović, 2011). 
Competing Pension Discourses 
The reforms to the Serbian pension 
system date back to the beginning of the 
2000s. The changes to the PAYG system 
10  In July 2013, the basis of the benefit amounted to RSD 7 530 (MRZSP, 2013), while the average salary and 
minimal wage in the same period amounted to RSD 44 182 and RSD 21 160 respectively (Paragraf, 2013).
11  The calculation refers to the amounts of average salary and child allowance in July 2013.
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included: raising the retirement age, chang-
ing the calculation formula by the index-
ation of pensions, introducing more rigid 
conditions for the granting of disability 
pensions and for early retirement, as well 
as eliminating some privileges. The trend 
of tightening eligibility criteria was not dis-
continued during the crisis and the changes 
of 2010 presented pre-planned measures 
to contain the pension costs. They were 
agreed upon with the International Mon-
etary Fund in 2009, as a condition for 
signing a stand-by arrangement. They are 
mainly in the domains of modifying condi-
tions for retirement on the basis of the “full 
qualifying period” and minimum age, priv-
ileged qualifying periods and indexation of 
pensions. The indexation of pensions was 
the most controversial topic in the process 
of legal changes in 2010. The actors of the 
debate were unions, The Pensioners Party12 
and the government of Serbia and it seems 
they had their hidden agendas, along with 
those that were self-evident. The World 
Bank’s role, once again, proved unavoid-
able. It designed guidelines for pension 
reform and imposed some of them on the 
government, given its disability of creating 
reforms independently due to a budget defi-
cit. They ranged from freezing pensions in 
2009 and 2010, indexing them pursuant 
to inflation, discouraging early retirement, 
and raising the retirement age for women 
to further improving of the administration 
of the system (Svetska banka, 2009). 
However, it must be noted, that reduc-
tions and austerity measures related to the 
pension system during the crisis have been 
connected to the efforts to decrease the fis-
cal expenditures for the pensions that were 
booming in the previous period. Namely, 
due to the concerns about depriving the 
pensioners “from participation in the fruits 
of economic growth” (Mijatović, 2008:88), 
the pensions were extraordinarily indexed 
in January and again in October 2008. Ad-
ditionally, by the end of 2008, there was a 
mechanism that was preventing an average 
pension to fall below 60% of an average 
salary. For example, this ratio fell to 57% in 
2007, so that the government of Serbia paid 
the difference up to 60% to the pensioners 
from the budget. Therefore, at the begin-
ning of the crisis, which was at the end of 
2008, the average pension was increased 
in real terms.13 This was contrast to 2008, 
when the average pension in 2011 amount-
ed to 54% of an average salary (Zdravković 
et al., 2012), there were no Government’s 
measures.
In the end, it was accepted that pensions 
be increased by 2% in December 2010, 
which was the first adjustment after two 
years. In April 2011, the adjustment was 
made according to the changes in consumer 
prices in the previous three months, and in 
October 2011 and April 2012 according to 
the changes in the cost of living and GDP 
growth. After October 2012, the adjustment 
was planned to occur twice a year (on the 1st 
of April and on the 1st of October) based on 
the changes in consumer prices and GDP 
growth. Despite the changes to the Law on 
the Budget System providing for the imple-
mentation of the agreed indexation by 2015 
or as long as the share of pensions in GDP 
reaches 10% of it (Vuković and Perišić, 
2012b), in September 2012, the new gov-
ernment suspended the rule for one year, 
and accepted their nominal increase of 2% 
in October 2012 and April 2013. 
12  PUPS – The Party of The United Pensioners of Serbia was founded in 2005 and since 2008 it has been one 
of the governing parties.
13  Despite constant reforms of indexation mechanisms, rapid growth of earnings in the period from 2001 to 2008 
resulted in rapid growth of pensions (Mijatović, 2008).
187
Rev. soc. polit., god. 22, br. 2, str. 177-194, Zagreb 2015. Perišić N., Vidojević J.: Responses of the Serbian Welfare State...
The changes of 2010 provided for ex-
traordinary adjustment of the minimum 
pension on the 1st of January 2011, by 1% 
compared to the minimum pension paid in 
2010. It is determined that the minimum 
pension cannot be below 27% of the aver-
age salary in the preceding year. This guar-
antee does not seem strong enough to pres-
ent an automatic stabilizer of the standard 
of living for the lowest income pensioners. 
However, in 2012 the government opted 
of paying additional funds to pensioners 
with the pensions below RSD 15 000.14 
For retired farmers, the minimum pension 
was determined at RSD 9 000 on the 1st 
of January 2011. Its amount is, therefore, 
only somewhat higher than social welfare 
benefits (Table 3). Additionally, although 
data on the number of elderly outside the 
pension system differ substantially, they 
nevertheless point to their above average 
poverty risk and the lowest efficiency of 
social transfers. In 2009, the poverty rate 
for the elderly was reduced from 18.9% to 
18.2% after social transfers payment (with-
out pensions) (Vlada RS, 2011a). Current-
ly, there is not any substitution of the zero 
pillar. Regarding its introduction, there ex-
ist two competing scenarios, but both are 
conditional. National experts suggest their 
introduction at the middle of the decade, 
provided that the share of pension expendi-
tures falls below 10% GDP (FREN, 2010). 
Alternatively, the World Bank suggests the 
expansion of the social welfare scheme 
(Svetska banka, 2009).
Another part of reforms, the introduc-
tion of voluntary pension insurance, was 
agreed upon with the World Bank even 
in 2001, but it was only in 2005 that the 
referenced Law was enacted. The share of 
net assets of the private pension funds in 
the national GDP is low, despite its growth. 
The reasons are manifold: short period of 
their existence, low purchasing power of 
the population intensified by the crisis, 
macro-economic instability, lack of infor-
mation, etc.
14  The pensioners with the pensions up to RSD 15 000 were paid on a quartal basis one–off payments (per RSD 
4 000) in the total amount of RSD 16 000 inclusive of June 2013.
Table 3.
Pensions and poverty lines, 2006-2011
Year Absolute pover-ty line, in RSD
Relative pover-








ers’ pension, in 
RSD
2006 6 621 7 171 6 878 4 815 5 171
2007 6 625 7 747 7 667 5 367 5 700
2008 7 401 8 923 9 946 6 962 7 446
2009 8 022 9 583 11 088 7 762 8 385
2010 8 431 10 206 11 088 7 762 8 385
2011 8 853 10 971 11 809 8 266 9 000
Source: Vlada RS, 2011b.
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At the beginning of 2013 there were 
180 850 beneficiaries in the accumulation 
phase (period of paying funds) with a to-
tal of 241 927 membership contracts. The 
highest increase in the number of beneficia-
ries was in 2009 and 2011, by about 9 000 
and 8 000 new beneficiaries respectively. 
While in 2010 there was a negligible in-
crease in beneficiaries. In 2012, the num-
ber increased by 5 000 (NBS, 2013). This 
could be explained partially by the delayed 
effect of the crisis and the fact that the crisis 
had just begun in 2009 so that in 2011 there 
was a moderate alleviation in the economy. 
Furthermore, the number of beneficiaries 
of private pension funds account for 2.5% 
of the population, in other words “every 
tenth employee is a member of a voluntary 
pension fund” (NBS, 2013:18). Along with 
the increased number of beneficiaries, the 
net property of private pension funds has 
steadily been increasing. Even so, the crisis 
contributed essentially to their decreased 
yields. 
In its anti–crisis package, the Govern-
ment of Serbia has concentrated its mea-
sures to support the third pillar in terms of 
tax reliefs, by gradually raising the amount 
of tax-free contributions in order to stimu-
late employers to streamline their funds to 
the voluntary pension plans for their em-
ployees. Also, it has offered the possibility 
to use fund assets as a guarantee when buy-
ing individually owned residential prop-
erty. On the other hand, it has provided an 
increase in the minimum age for withdraw-
ing accrued funds from 53 to 58 years of 
life and has limited the amount of accrued 
funds which may be withdrawn as a lump 
sum to 30% of funds in the account.
Health Reform Puzzle
The trend of the stabilization in the col-
lection of funds for health-care as well as 
in increasing health-care expenditures per 
capita was interrupted in 2009. At that time 
a cut in health expenditures by 15% was 
announced, as a consequence of reduced 
inflow of contributions to the Health Insur-
ance Fund of The Republic of Serbia, due 
to the crisis. Government projections for 
the period 2011-2013 predicted a slight de-
crease in health expenditures in the share 
of GDP, or stagnation at the same level, 
compared to the preceding period. Gov-
ernment projections were 5.6% in 2011, 
5.3% in 2012 and 5.1% in 2013 (Vlada RS, 
2011b). However, the GDP of Serbia was 
comparatively low and its growth projec-
tions in 2012-2013 were very modest. Fur-
thermore, if nothing else, the expected cuts 
were expected to result in the reduced qual-
ity of health services.
Additionally, an imbalance between the 
share of GDP of expenditures for the na-
tional public health care system and its out-
comes points to its long-lasting inefficien-
cy requiring reforms of the system, even 
before the crisis. In this regard, the recom-
mendations of the World Bank ranged from 
reducing the number of beds, decreasing 
the number of non-medical staff and phy-
sicians in health centers, to improving de-
cision-making procedures (Svetska banka, 
2009). The orientation toward reducing the 
number of non-medical workers, number 
of beds, etc., has had a dual purpose. This 
orientation is a consequence of austerity 
programmes, but it is also an unachieved 
aim of reforms initiated in 2003. The freez-
ing of salaries for employees in the health 
sector, as a part of the obligations within 
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the package signed with the IMF, is a con-
sequence of the crisis, as is the declared re-
duction of 10% in the salaries of the health 
sector, as of 2013.15 Planned decentraliza-
tion should also contribute to savings for 
the state budget. A need to distribute exist-
ing funds for health in a different way, with 
a view to achieving better outcomes with 
the same revenues, is therefore, seen as the 
most important aim. The government sug-
gested changing the existing funding ar-
rangements (i.e. introduction of capitation 
and DRGs at the primary and secondary/
tertiary levels of care respectively). Current 
assessments point to worse results than ex-
pected. 
There are indications that the accessi-
bility of health care has been compromised 
for many during the crisis, despite the legal 
expansion of those having free health care. 
The right to health services is exercised by 
6 786 333 inhabitants of Serbia (RFZO, 
2011), so that the coverage rate is 93%. The 
“missing” 7% can be attributed to minority 
groups (Roma), refugees and internally dis-
placed persons, etc., but also those employ-
ees whose employers do not pay contribu-
tions for them. A research study of social 
inclusion in rural areas, conducted in 2010, 
showed that “12.6% of the interviewed 
stated they did not have health insurance” 
(Vuković, 2011:173), while 20% of the in-
terviewed stated that due to a lack of mon-
ey they could not buy necessary medicines, 
8% could not buy medical appliances, and 
17% could not pay for check-ups by spe-
cialists (Vuković, 2011). Another side of 
the crisis, in terms of reduced earnings and 
increased poverty, causes actual unafford-
ability of health care.
The development of the private health 
sector, so far, does not seem to present a 
solution to the problems of public health 
care. Public and private health sectors ex-
ist independent of each other, despite the 
proclaimed reform aims with respect to 
“increasing the participation of the private, 
for-profit and non-profit sector in render-
ing health care financed by the Health In-
surance Fund of the Republic of Serbia” 
(MZ, 2003:25). Almost one decade after 
the proclamation, apart from papers, there 
have not been any developments (Vuković 
and Perišić, 2012b). Therefore unsurpris-
ingly, the so-called out-of-pocket payments 
amount to about 25% of total expenditures 
on health care in Serbia (WHO, 2010), 
which ranks it high compared to many 
other European countries. Even worse, 
data from the National Health Account in 
Serbia suggest that more than 35% of costs 
of health care are financed by households 
(MZ, 2010). Thus, private expenditure for 
private health care services significantly in-
creases household expenses (Vuković and 
Perišić, 2012b).
CONCLUSION
The world economic crisis of 2008 
posed some serious challenges to the al-
ready disputed access to welfare benefits 
and services and their quality, and even 
more to the sustainability of national wel-
fare programmes. However, the crisis of 
2008 did not present an event that would 
reverse the situation. Budget deficits in the 
state have been one reason for not creat-
ing stimulatory measures as a reaction to 
the crisis. Of course, this is only a part of 
the explanation of events, outside of the 
welfare state itself. Discourse on auster-
ity measures in the welfare state of Serbia 
has been evident in the public domain long 
before the economic crisis. The reason for 
that is the conceptual and practical crisis 
15  However, the newly elected government did not put into force the 10% reduction of salaries in the health 
sector.
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of the welfare state itself, ever since the 
1980s. The socialist welfare state declared 
very favourable rights, while the control 
mechanisms were weak along with strong 
bureaucratic structures. These contributed 
to various types of misuse of relatively 
generous benefits and services and resulted 
in an extreme economic overburden to the 
state. Consequently, a huge gap between 
the declared rights and their implementa-
tion became the dominant feature of social-
ist practice. Social needs of the population 
were rather modest compared to the social 
needs of the population in capitalist coun-
tries, but also well above the national eco-
nomic potentials. The period of etatism in 
social welfare was followed by the period 
of quasi-etatism in the 1990s. The govern-
ment kept many of its obligations, fearing 
a populist backlash, but it was not able to 
fulfill them. An extreme burden for welfare 
during the period was transferred to fami-
lies and informal networks. In practice, 
from the beginning of the transition of the 
1990s, market principles have been widely 
introduced into all spheres of society. Par-
tially as a consequence of a revolt against 
the past, and partially due to a strong ne-
cessity for attracting foreign capital, both 
at the levels of individuals and society, the 
market has been accepted as a governing 
ideology in the provision of welfare as 
well. As the acceptance of socialist values 
was highly dogmatized forty years ago, 
very much the same happened with their 
rejection. 
The crisis of the 1990s was extremely 
dramatic in the national context compared 
to the crisis of 2008. The crisis of the 1990s 
was multi–dimensional with interrelated 
factors such as: financial, economic, po-
litical, social and ideological factors. Thus, 
new opportunities were numerous and mu-
tually reinforcing. The latter crisis, that of 
2008, was primarily financial and econom-
ic, and has been intensifying the already 
well–established trajectory of austerity, 
without the potential of reversing the lib-
eral policies and programmes.
Market elements in the welfare state re-
sulted in institutional reforms in the 2000s, 
and the resulting changes have become 
complex, rooted and established. The ar-
gument of timing is important here. Early 
reactions to demographic, economic, finan-
cial, and other challenges were of utmost 
importance, since they seemed to reduce 
room for maneuvers. Those early reactions 
were dominated by different and incon-
sistent agendas for economic and social 
policy reform. This was partly due to the 
fact that since 2000, every administration 
of the elected-government in Serbia was 
a coalition government administration, 
which consisted of political parties and 
movements with different socio-economic 
programmes (Arandarenko and Golicin, 
2006). Additionally, international financial 
institutions, especially The International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, had a 
strong influence on the course of the chang-
es. As for the other relevant actors such as: 
trade unions, civil society organizations 
and professional associations, they were 
almost invisible and their role marginal-
ized, except in the cases where their par-
ticipation was explicitly required (such as 
the PRSP). Another argument, that of self–
reinforcing events, came into the arena for 
two reasons. First, being a late reformer 
and implementing many ad hoc measures 
in the welfare sector, Serbia found itself in 
a locked–in situation and second, the intro-
duction of alternatives to the market prin-
ciples has become increasingly expensive. 
There was also a role played by individual, 
institutional and organizational adaptations 
to this new track, resulting in the creation 
of new networks and vested interests, and 
so on.
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Devalued and compromised socialist 
social values and institutions did not leave 
any room for the survival of those mecha-
nisms that would prevent uncritical whole-
sale acceptance of market regulations in 
social policy. That has transformed into a 
legal framework regulating social welfare 
in terms of welfare provision privatization. 
Therefore, welfare reforms have translated 
into rationalization and austerity measures. 
For example, cash benefits for the unem-
ployed have been tightened and funds 
which were supposed to be devoted to ac-
tivation policy have been denied, thus pre-
venting the actual development of policy. 
Cash benefits for the poor are very low and 
social services have been transferred to the 
private sector to a large extent. Child allow-
ances lost their universal character. Pension 
reforms commenced with restructuring the 
public pillar with a view to decreasing the 
expenditures. Rationalization measures 
in the health sector have also been intro-
duced, but the reforms of this system are 
in the early stage compared to the others. 
All these developments are evidence of the 
shrinking role of the state in welfare pro-
vision. Moreover its further reduction can 
be expected. Because the welfare system is 
not sustainable, those modifications can be 
expected in the direction of making rules 
stricter.
However, since currently defined aus-
terity measures mean that the state transfers 
part of its obligations to the private sector 
as well as to the informal sector, poten-
tially, the values of solidarity and mutual-
ity could be perceived as less important by 
the members of the society. This change 
in values would lead to a narrower focus 
of the national welfare state. In case it be-
comes identified with support to marginal-
ized groups, it would become increasingly 
difficult to provide a wide base of social 
support to its programmes and measures. 
Austerity measures and consequent empha-
sis on individual responsibilities bring up 
the issue of how to support and empower 
self–reliance by individuals and families. 
Given the current rates of poverty and un-
employment, it does not seem that the indi-
viduals in need of social welfare and their 
families are equipped for self–reliance. 
The state of Serbia has skipped the step of 
supporting and empowering individuals to 
practice such a concept. Moreover, despite 
the economic progress during 2001–2008, 
the welfare state proved to be vulnerable. 
Provision of social welfare was prevented 
by the orientation away from individuals 
toward market forces. The activation of the 
national welfare state would be a preferable 
concept. It would mean a transformation of 
the passive welfare state essentially ori-
ented toward benefits into an active welfare 
state oriented toward services. 
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Sažetak







Globalna financijska kriza razotkrila je ozbiljne slabosti u srpskom gospodarskom i so-
cijalnom sustavu. Kratkoročne mjere za ublažavanje negativnih učinaka krize bile su samo 
djelomično uspješne. 2010. godine socijalna je država naznačena kao jedno od prioritetnih 
područja srednjoročnih državnih reformi, no dosada nije bilo radikalnih rezova, iako nije 
sigurno je li takva situacija održiva. Glavne smjerove reforme određivao je, i određivat će, 
manjak proračunskih sredstava (drugim riječima, potreba za smanjivanjem udjela socijal-
nih transfera unutar BDP-a i njihova održivost). Iako su dostupnost i kvaliteta proglašeni 
jednako važnim ciljevima reforme, učinci reforme ukazuju da su fiskalna ograničenja 
najvažniji izazov. Mjere štednje, karakteristične za srpsku socijalnu državu, u vrijeme krize 
nisu povezane samo s krizom, nego se mogu promatrati kao dio opadajuće uloge države 
nakon pada socijalizma u devedesetim godinama 20. stoljeća. Stoga je ponekad teško 
razlučiti između mjera kao reakcije na krizu i onih koje su razmatrane prije krize, jer se 
čini da su njihovi ciljevi rijetko kompatibilni.
Ključne riječi: kriza, tržište rada, socijalna skrb, mirovine, zdravstvo.
